This is a reply to:
http://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/guile-devel/2014-09/msg00118.html
> Sorry, I really only registered to submit a couple of bugs, but I
> couldn't miss the opportunity! Well, you see, there is a very well
> known ethical school of thinking which does not think that ethics is
> relative (I don't believe that too, but for other reasons). Immanuel
> Kant is by far the best known proponent of universal ethics. I also
> happen to work on my future thesis, which is about formalization of
> ethics (as you would guess, if that's possible to formalize, or, at
> least, I believe so, then I also must believe it to be universal).
No I wouldn't have guessed that, because I cannot understand it at
all. For example, it is possible to formalise classical logic, and
also intuitionistic logic. Similarly, one can formalise Euclidean
geometry and also numerous non-Euclidean geometries, and one can
formalise higher-order logic and also first-order logic. So what does
the possibility of formalising a system tell you about whether or not
it is 'universal'? All I can see that it tells you is that that system
is not necessarily inconsistent, which in itself is hardly saying
anything at all.
> The examples I like to give in this debate (of course there are
> other famous school of ethical thought which disagree with this) is
> the example of an elevator, which must implement an ethical program
> in order to be considered functional (w/o going into detail, it is
> possible to construct an elevator, which will be more efficient than
> those we use normally, but it would be perceived as unfair).
This elevator would wait until there were balanced loads, so that the
weight of those wishing to descend would lift that of those who wish
to ascend, and very little energy would be required to run the system?
I was thinking about this a few months ago. Here in Bolivia we have a
3km potential difference in height between La Paz and the
Amazon basin. The mass of people and goods descending might be very
similar to that of those ascending. So I was wondering if it would be
feasible to build a funicular of some kind.
Whether this would be perceived as unfair or not is entirely a matter
of education. If people were educated properly they would know that it
is unjust to profit from anything which wastes resources and degrades
the quality of life of other people. There is nothing particularly
difficult about this idea. But people who lack education often justify
their moral lassitude by claiming all moral values are relative. "It
all depends on your education!" they say. And they're right: it
depends on whether or not you were educated. So the only reason that
universal ethics "don't exist" is that a substantial proportion of
people are for all practical purposes uneducated.
> To put a brief argument for Kant's view of the problem: he believed
> that the right thing to do is to act freely, he also believed that
> given the opportunity to act freely everyone would choose the same
> strategy. These ideas seemed quite solid at the time, but not so
> much any more. The world of philosophy of the day was deterministic
> and had very weird concepts of what reality is made of :)
> Nevertheless, many adopt his categorical imperative as a moral norm
> (which I don't think anyone should, but that's a separate story).
I don't understand this at all, but then I have never understood
anything I read of Kant. And the only thing that I read and understood
which anyone else wrote about Kant's writing was, I think, by Roger
Scrouton, (but it was a long time ago, so I could be wrong) in a
little book called "Kant," to the effect that "Kant's thought is
incomprehensible."
> Another great ethical thinker, who believed in universal ethics is
> Aristotle. Surprisingly, he has a much better grounded view to
> offer. The collection of his view also known in the modern world as
> teleology survived a lot of paradigm shifts. (I subscribe to this
> idea too). It was mostly advanced by philosophers of Abrahamic
> religions, and so it is known in the modern world as Tomis or
> Aviccenism, but it doesn't have to be religious in nature. I think
> it was just comfortable for religions, which wanted to be universal
> to have a doctrine, which also wanted to be universal. Put shortly,
> the premise of this doctrine is that it is good to give which is
> due, and it is bad otherwise. Which, kind of, transfers the
> responsibility of answering the question of what is good to what is
> due, but, in the same sense as we have logical system which don't
> define what is true and what is false (this is mandatory defined
> outside the system), and they are still useful.
I don't recall reading anything like "it is good to give what is due"
in Aristotle. The word 'due', in English, carries a sense of
ownership, obligation or debt, and neither of the books Aristotle
wrote on ethics have any of that sense about them: they are all about
fortune, God, judgement and knowledge. Are you sure you are not getting
Aristotle mixed up with Jesus Christ when he said, concerning the
payment of taxes, "Give unto Caesar that which belongs to Caesar"?
If I had to summarise Aristotle's many hundreds of pages on ethics in
a few words I would say that, since the essence of a thing is that
thing's special nature, which is also the reason or purpose for which
that thing exists; and since the special nature of man is our capacity
for rational thought, that is also the reason or end to which we
exist. So what is good for man (i.e. all people, so universal) is the
exercising of 'his' capacity for reason. Therefore whenever people
reason to the utmost of their ability, they are being good. That is,
excellence in thought is right or moral, and anything less than this
is wrong or immoral. It follows then that all evil we can know is
simply human error, or stupidity, and nothing more. And the greater
good is God, who is life itself, and the living self dependent
actuality of thought, which is eternal and most good; so the reason or
purpose (the final cause, in the teleological language) of human life
is to realize, here on Earth, the eternal living mind of God. And we
do this through reason, and only through reason.
Rather than reading commentaries on Aristotle, I recommend going
straight to his own writing, which I have always found to be far, far
more easily understandable than any commentaries. These always seem to
be more concerned with comparing and classifying his "thought," but
without actually thinking any of it.
----
> I also read the OP, and, I think that there are thoughts that could
> be useful, but it is unhelpful that the reaction creates a
> conflicting situation.
The conflict you see is not unfortunate or "unhelpful"; quite the
opposite: it is the war against evil. You will see this wherever
idiots talk rubbish without thinking about what they're saying. It
isn't actually conflict, because the idiots typically can't respond
with anything except a series of ever more convincing demonstrations
of their complete and utter stupidity. It seems to be some kind of
public self-humiliation rite they need to go through. It's best just
to observe, and try not to laugh at anyone.
> I would suggest the following proposition to Ian Grant, I think it
> may be helpful:
I don't think you thought at all, I think you just do what millions of
people do, and that is you don't actually think, you simply write and
say what people expect one to write and say in such and such a
situation. Most people "think" that's what thought actually is.
> It is possible to build a good, solid mathematical model (and it
> seems like you are into that kind of programming, since you mention
> Dijkstra and Milner very often), but it will not map well to the
> actual observed phenomena. This is very well known problem in areas
> like molecular biology, particle physics and economics / social
> studies. I.e. for example, it is possible to come up with a model,
> which, given some input DNA will make interesting inferences about
> it, but will be completely worthless for making predictions about
> how actual ribosomes synthesize polypeptides.
What do you mean by 'actual observed phenomena'? If you know anything
at all about molecular biology then you know that polypeptide
synthesis is not something that is actually observed, it is an
abstract process which exists purely as a series of inferences from
quantified experimental results. So it is a mathematical model. What,
then, are the "interesting inferences" to which you refer? And why are
they interesting? And why is it "worthless for making predictions
about how actual ribosomes synthesize polypeptides"? As you can
probably tell, I don't have the faintest idea what you are trying to
say, but I very much doubt that you do either!
> Quite similarly, the hypothesis suggested by Milner, I think it was
> "properly typed programs can't be buggy" appears not to hold
> water.
The only similarity I see is that of nonsense with nonsense. You can
be quite sure Robin Milner did not ever write or say anything like
this. Standard ML has been used all over the world, for over 20 years
now, to teach students programming. So no-one in their right mind
would claim that typed programs can't be buggy: that's an utterly
ridiculous idea. The 'hypothesis' you refer to, is the actual
knowledge that type checking in fact catches many common
programming errors. And I have never heard anyone who has actually
used a typed programming language try to refute this! Even C
programmers know it.
> It is a good, consistent, even solid theory,
It "appears not to hold water," but it's nevertheless "good,
consistent and solid"? Bullshit! It's none of these, it is a
completely fucking stupid theory!
> but it doesn't capture the nature of programming. And it doesn't
> deliver on the promise.
No it can't, because the "promise" is something idiotic which you just
invented in order to have something to say for yourself which you
thought might suit your image as the wise-old-man of scheme-land. As
far as "the nature of programming" goes, if you mean by this "the
common practice of programming," then I think the only thing that
could capture that nature would itself be complete and utter
nonsense. So your "good, consistent, solid theory that doesn't hold
water" actually does do that, in buckets! But I am not interested in
"capturing the nature of programming," I am only interested in
changing it, because it is stupid and evil.
> Programs in ML, too, have bugs. I don't say this to discourage you,
> I think that searching for this kind of models is important.
You don't need to tell me that. See the following, which I wrote
several months ago, which is all about the stupid mistakes I made, and
bugs in my Standard ML implementation of, guess what? The
Hindley-Milner type checking algorithm!
http://livelogic.blogspot.com/2014/07/hindley-milner-type-inference.html
> I just wanted to say that maybe your conclusions have been premature
> and lacking the statistical evidence (lack of evidence isn't
> itself a proof of the contrary).
No Oleg, your summary of "my conclusions" is premature. You have just
spouted off a load of utter drivel, because you did not take the
trouble to properly read anything that I wrote before telling me that
it is wrong. See the PDF referred to in the 'original post' as far as
these lists are concerned, which is here:
http://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/guile-devel/2014-08/msg00064.html
I don't have any advice for you, but Ed. does. This is from:
http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/EWD/ewd01xx/EWD196.PDF
"Be aware of the fact that experience does by no means
automatically lead to wisdom and understanding, in other words:
make a conscious effort to learn from your precious experiences."
Ian
Oh, it appears I have more time, so...
ReplyDeleteIn what sense do I use "due"? - "Moral obligation". But it isn't interesting in itself because virtually every ethical teaching has to reflect on this. What I wanted to emphasize about Aristotle is the fact that he believed in universal (on this later) value of things. To him it was possible to tell "the thing duly belongs to person X, because Y". The example of his thought is typically given by his description of a contest of flutists. Aristotle asks who of the flutists must receive the best flute, and proceeds to conclude that it should be the one who can play it the best. I.e. he believes that it is our moral duty to behave so that the reward be adequate for actions. Monetary reward is just one case of a more general rule.
In what sense do I use "universal"? - Those philosophers who believe in body-mind being two different things, consequently, that something they call "qualia", i.e. a strictly personal experience, exists, than it is possible that there are personal worlds. And no universal (shared by everyone) world exists. So, when I say that something is "universal", I mean that the concept of "qualia" is a mistake. I.e. that we live in a single world and that we can attempt to resolve disputes about it (notice, we may not be able to, due to other resons).
What do I mean by models (where I talked about biology). I confess, I don't know what is actually required to say that the phenomena is observed. I used it colloquially to mean that "we know something happens", but I didn't mean we actually see it (though I don't think it's inherently impossible, why would it be? the best microscopes can actually show molecules such as glucose, well, anyway). Let's try a different example:
Egyptian pyramids. You can create a two-dimensional mathematical model of pyramids as triangles. The model may be in every respect correct if you follow the correct procedures of planimetry, but when you try to apply the conclusions to real pyramids, you may discover that you didn't account for things like third dimension, weight or weather conditions, geopolitical situation around them and so on. I.e. what I was trying to say is that the correctness of the model doesn't guarantee its usefulness for any object it is a model of. A good reference point for this is the "Frame problem".
What I meant by statistical observations is that you come with a model, which, simply says: programmers should be trusted less than non-programmers because they deal with more (potentially dangerous) programs. - There's no mistakes in the model, it makes perfect sense to suggest something like that. In the world where programmers make no effort to protect themselves against malicious programs that would be the most likely state of events. Statistical research on the other hand would have discovered that there are more than one factor that influences how secure one's computer is. And, without making such claims, I see no reason why it can't be true: general computer savviness may have an effect on the safety of one's computer much grater than that of the quantity of programs downloaded to it. - Who knows? Before you run the experiment you can't tell.
ReplyDeleteWhich brings us to the last point: how do I know I think or that I understand what you are thinking about? - Well, I don't :) But the problem is that no one else does. Knowing is a difficult philosophic problem. You may want to look up Gettier problem to get a sense of what the confusion is all about. But not only it's a problem to know, but we don't have an accepted definition of what thought is. When do we say that the system thinks? - I don't know that either. I hope to discover that one day, but the hope is futile :)
On the same note: is it okay to make a discount for those who "didn't know how to act morally"? It's, again, not a question I'd like to answer in general. Would you believe that we should forgive people who consciously avoid learning about the laws so that they could commit crimes?
> What I meant by statistical observations is that you come with a model,
ReplyDelete> which, simply says: programmers should be trusted less than
> non-programmers because they deal with more (potentially dangerous)
> programs.
This is not the model which was the subject of your criticism, or of my response. But never mind.
> There's no mistakes in the model, it makes perfect sense to suggest
> something like that. In the world where programmers make no effort to
> protect themselves against malicious programs that would be the most
> likely state of events.
This is more or less what you earlier referred to as "the practice of programming."
> Statistical research on the other hand would have discovered that there
> are more than one factor that influences how secure one's computer is.
Well if you know what it would have discovered without actually doing that research, then what is the basis of your claim that "statistical research" is a valid way of learning anything about anything?!
> And, without making such claims, I see no reason why it can't be true:
> general computer savviness may have an effect on the safety of one's
> computer much grater than that of the quantity of programs downloaded
> to it. - Who knows? Before you run the experiment you can't tell.
*I* know! So the answer to your question is "Yes I can tell, because when I pointed out an *extremely* serious vulnerability with *every single* GNU package, I received no response whatsoever from any of the developers, apart from stupid outraged indignation." This was the motivation for my writing that 'essay' on the software development process itself being the main cause of security failures.
> Which brings us to the last point: how do I know I think or that I
ReplyDelete> understand what you are thinking about? - Well, I don't :)
That was patently obvious to *me,* and to anyone else who took the trouble to read what I had written. And I think that if you were honest you would have admitted it was obvious to you too.
> But the problem is that no one else does. Knowing is a difficult
> philosophic problem.
I can quite believe it is a difficult philosophic problem for _you,_ but plenty of primary-school children manage this extraordinary feat.
> You may want to look up Gettier problem to get a sense of what the
> confusion is all about.
No I don't. The fact that there is a great deal of confusion about it is no indicator that it is something worth thinking about. Quite the opposite.
> But not only it's a problem to know, but we don't have an accepted definition
> of what thought is. When do we say that the system thinks? - I don't know
> that either.
I actually have no trouble believing you when you say this, but that does not mean I think it is a universal problem!
> I hope to discover that one day, but the hope is futile :)
Well one thing that ought to help you, if you really do want to know anything, is the knowledge that it is not possible for one thing to be said to both be and at the same time not be, in the same sense. For example, hope cannot be said to be futile.
> On the same note: is it okay to make a discount for those who "didn't
> know how to act morally"? It's, again, not a question I'd like to answer
> in general. Would you believe that we should forgive people who
> consciously avoid learning about the laws so that they could commit crimes?
I don't know what motivated this question, but you are not comparing like with like. You have on the one hand a person who is consciously avoiding learning something, because he is stupid enough to think it makes him more able to commit crimes! And on the other hand you have a person who is quite unconsciously stupid. I don't know whether I should "make more of a discount" for the first, because he is unwittingly stupid, or for the second, because although he is supposed to be consciously stupid, he is also, unwittingly, many, many times more stupid than the first! The question is more amusing than interesting.
Sorry Oleg, but the quality of your "scholarship" is absolutely abysmal. You are more than welcome to continue with your "philosophical investigations" but please, do it without me!
Ian